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No ‘new spirit’? Max Weber’s account of the dynamic 
of contemporary capitalism through ‘pure adaptation’ 
and the shaping of adequate subjects
Isabelle Darmon
Abstract
This article takes issue with Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s already classic thesis 
according to which contemporary capitalism rests on a ‘new spirit’, bringing to bear 
a reading of Weber’s own account of the dynamic and spirit of the contemporary 
capitalism of his age, and of the way in which it mobilises workers and entrepreneurs. 
More specifically the article highlights Weber’s idea that advanced capitalism, far 
from relying on any ‘new spirit’, simply thrives by fostering ‘pure adaptation’ and 
both adequate and active ‘economic subjects’. This is shown to be due, in particular, 
to the dynamic of rationality and irrationality at the heart of the spirit that turned 
capitalism into a mass system.
Keywords: adaptation, rationality, spirit of capitalism, type of human being.
Introduction
Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s already classic New spirit of cap-
italism (2005 [1999]) has undeniably contributed in re-establishing 
‘capitalism’ as an issue for a critical social science (Kemple 2007: 
147), about a century after Werner Sombart and especially Max 
Weber had began a ‘serious discussion’ of it (Ghosh 2005: 382). But 
although the very title of the book directly and conspicuously echoes 
Weber’s enquiry into the encounter of capitalism with the spirit that 
turned it into the dominant and all pervasive economic system of the 
contemporary age, their account of the dynamic of contemporary 
capitalism and its spirit does not take any notice of Weber’s own 
analysis. Weber sketched out such analysis in the second chapter of 
the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (first published in 1904, 
and complemented in the 1920 revision) and further explained them 
in the ‘Rebuttals’ he wrote in response to his critics (most clearly 
in the second reply to Rachfahl); he defined modalities of empirical 
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investigation in his 1908 methodological introduction for the survey 
on industrial labour; and he proposed a conceptual elaboration in 
the ‘Sociological Categories of Economic Action’ (chapter 2 of Part 
I of Economy and Society), especially, as seems logical, in section 14, 
which compares market and planned economies in particular with 
respect to the nature of the ‘impulse for economic action’—or the 
sources of mobilisation for work and enterprise—in each of the two 
economic systems.1 Weber’s exposition of the momentum of contem-
porary capitalism as arising from the interplay between formal capi-
talist rationality and the material rationalities constantly interfering 
with it, as well as of the sources for the mobilisation of individu-
als for work and profit seeking, that is to say the spirit of capitalism 
itself, is paralleled by Boltanski and Chiapello’s exploration of what 
they refer to as the constrained ‘moral dimension’ of capitalism (2005: 
486) and of the spirit of capitalism as ‘ideology that justifies engage-
ment in capitalism’ (2005: 8). But their perspective—the (constrained) 
contribution of capitalism to the ‘common good’—radically differs 
from Weber’s conception of the contemporary capitalist economy as 
a differentiated sphere with its own logic at war with those of other 
life orders and value spheres. I thus argue in this article that, in the 
very much needed reflection on the dynamic and spirit of contempo-
rary capitalism perhaps re-opened by Boltanski and Chiapello, a re-
examination of Weber’s texts addressing contemporary capitalism 
is indispensable—as these have been ‘much neglected’ (Ghosh 2005: 
369; see also Swedberg 2011: 62).
 This article purports to be a contribution to such re-examination, 
more specifically of Weber’s idea that advanced capitalism, far from 
relying on any ‘new spirit’, simply thrives by fostering ‘pure adapta-
tion’, which does not mean absence of life or innovation. The con-
tention that we could be in a phase of capitalism with a ‘new spirit’ 
is problematic and misleading insofar as any renewal, in Weber’s 
understanding, could only take place within the limits of overall 
adaptation to the rationality of the ‘cosmos of the modern ratio-
nalised capitalist economy’ (1991: 214). The spirit of inner-worldly 
asceticism had meant exceeding the everyday and its repetitiveness, 
 1. As we shall see, there are also crucial elements on the dynamic of contem-
porary capitalism at the end of the preface to the lecture on General Economic History 
(hereafter GEH). A more complete exposition of Weber’s conception of the spirit of 
capitalism in advanced capitalism should also take into account the writings ante-
rior to the Protestant Ethic, singularly his pieces on the stock exchange and on rural 
labour.
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it had required ‘stretching out’ towards a point beyond the every-
day—as Weber vividly put it in his comparison between the Confu-
cian and Puritan ethics (1991: 199)—but precisely this is what has 
disappeared with the entrenchment of modern capitalism.
 However, advanced capitalism does not thrive on the mobilisation 
of mere homines oeconomici—the bearers of pure economic rationality—
either. For Weber, as for Boltanski and Chiapello, there is a ‘spirit’ 
to advanced capitalism that continues mobilising the mass of human 
beings on other counts than just their material interests. Weber’s inves-
tigation of the shaping of the modern type of human being, of modern 
Menschentum, which is intricately bound up with an analysis of the 
mechanisms for the fostering of adaptation to the dominant logics of 
the depersonalised orders, showed that these orders do not produce 
mere rational agents but rather shape human beings with substantive 
orientations, affects and attachments besides their rational interests. 
Each order ‘educates and creates’ the ‘subjects that it needs’ not only 
‘externally’ but also ‘inwardly’, i.e. ‘motivationally’ (1920: 37, 1988a: 
517, 1998a: 92), and Weber provided clear indications of what these 
subjects were in his own time, including in the thoroughly deperson-
alised capitalist economic sphere. Indeed my contention in this article 
is that it is this interplay between the ‘rational’ and the ‘irrational’ 
(unravelled in the first section below) that underpins for Weber the 
evolution of contemporary capitalism as a differentiated sphere of 
human action and its capacity for mobilisation, without any need 
to resort to the problematic notion of the contribution of capitalism 
to a ‘common good’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: xx). I bring out 
Weber’s sketches of figures of contemporary types of human beings 
(the worker and the entrepreneur) and their formation and adapta-
tion respectively in the second and third sections. This then allows 
me, in the fourth section, to set Boltanski and Chiapello’s propositions 
regarding the dynamic and justification of contemporary capitalism 
against my understanding of Weber’s analysis of the same—before 
concluding on the possibility of a new spirit.2
The spirit and dynamic of rational capitalism
As Weber explained in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capital-
ism (hereafter PE) and the following ‘Rebuttals’, whereas the ‘form’ 
of capitalism had historically been filled by ‘very different kinds of 
 2. This article is based on my recently completed PhD thesis (see Darmon 
2011).
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“spirit” ’, and, ‘could also—and most often [would]—stand in vari-
ous graded “relations of elective affinity” to certain historical types 
of “spirit” ’ (1910a: 200, 2001: 75), only the ‘specifically modern 
“spirit” of capitalism burst forth as a mass phenomenon. This is what 
matters here’ (1920: 42; 2002: 21).3 In particular, as Weber explained 
in chapter 2 of PE, ‘economic rationalism’, which Sombart makes the 
‘basic motif of the modern economy’ (1920: 60), much pre-dated the 
advent of capitalism as a mass system. For economic rationalism to 
constitute, against traditionalism, the ‘spirit’ of a capitalist economic 
sphere which was fully differentiated and almost fully autonomous, 
there had to be a long ‘preparation’ and, fundamentally, the creation 
of a ‘type of human being (Menschentum) that made it [such ratio-
nality] his practically’ (1910b: 597).4 Economic rationalism of its own 
could not constitute the spirit that converted capitalism into a force 
‘pervading life as a whole’ (1910b.: 587), this only happened once 
it was upheld by a component that instilled a whole ‘habitus’ into 
entrepreneurs and workers alike, ‘that made them very specifically 
suited to meet the demands of early modern capitalism’: the ‘spirit 
of the vocational-professional type of human being’ (Geist des Beruf-
smenschentums) (1910b: 592). PE is Weber’s demonstration of such 
process.
 But Weber’s dedication to ‘the historical and theoretical knowledge 
of the general cultural significance of capitalist development’ (Jaffé, 
Sombart and Weber 1904: V) particularly stems from his assessment 
of the influence of capitalism for present-day culture, as Dieter Henrich 
showed in his analysis of the notion of significance (Henrich 1952: 
81). And even though Weber stated the usually superfluous char-
acter of ‘religious factors’ for upholding advanced capitalism, even 
though he registered the ‘inner dissolution of the unity’ which had 
uniquely bound the Puritan’s personality (i.e. his ethical qualities) 
with his profession (1910b: 593), he still referred to the same ‘spirit 
of capitalism’ in the contemporary period. Indeed the content of this 
spirit consists in treating work and money-making as ‘absolute ends 
in themselves’ pursued rationally; not as a means towards a just suf-
ficient income, towards unfettered gain, adventure and/or prestige. 
In other words, in putting man ‘at the service of his business and 
 3. I have reinstated the inverted commas for ‘spirit’ which are omitted in the 
Kalberg translation.
 4. Wilhelm Hennis has established the centrality of Menschentum and its fate 
for Weber, and it seems to me that this importance is now widely acknowledged 
whether designated as ‘central’ or not (see Hennis 2000a).
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not the reverse’ (1920: 46, 54) remains the order of the day: work 
and money-making are to be treated by the worker and the entre-
preneur respectively as if to a calling, a vocation. But the mode of 
mobilisation operated by this spirit is wholly different: where it had 
once consisted in ethical education through the constant inner and 
external checking of one’s ethical qualification, the relation to one’s 
work is now usually ‘a pure product of adaptation’ to the conditions 
of advanced capitalism (1920: 55; 2002: 32). However this also means 
that capitalism continues to be unable to mobilise purely on the basis 
of rational material interests: indeed in PE, Weber had uncovered 
how the interplay of the rational and the irrational had been at the 
core of the mass mobilisation for modern rational capitalism. But he 
also uncovered this dynamic at the heart of advanced capitalism. My 
argument here is that it is in fact this interplay that constitutes the 
spirit of capitalism and its dynamic. In order to see this more clearly, 
we need first to detour through Weber’s discovery of the spirit of 
another sphere of human action, the ‘spirit’ of Western music.
 As shown so well by Christoph Braun (1992, 1999), Weber’s study 
of music was in fact chiefly a study of its ‘spirit’, spurred by the 
specifically Western mode of rationalisation of chords (tonal ratio), 
and of the way in which it mobilised ‘life’, here the will and pas-
sion of composers, for musical creation5. How then does the ‘spirit’ 
of the Western harmonic music system compare with the ‘spirit’ of 
capitalism?
 In the music study (Weber 2004),6 Weber unravelled and con-
ceptualised the inner momentum of a worldly cultural sphere, the 
Western harmonic music system, in which the impetus of rationali-
sation so to speak discovers its own in-built irrationality, and where 
this interplay between the rational and the irrational and the way in 
which it is resolved becomes constitutive of musical creativity. He 
showed that (1) ‘all rationalised harmonic music’, i.e. based on the 
rationalisation of chords, is faced with the ‘inescapable’ difference 
 5. Weber’s study of the musical sphere also unveiled the relations between 
the ‘external conditions’ of the sphere and its inner dynamic, in particular the way 
in which the organisation of production (of technical means, e.g. instruments) and 
consumption itself impacts on the inner dynamic of the sphere (see Weber 2004).
 6. The title of the English translation, The rational and social foundations of music 
(Weber 1958), is the translation of a posthumous title devised by the editors (Mari-
anne Weber and Theodor Kroyer), but Weber most often referred to it as his ‘history 
of music’ (which is consistent with the fact that the study is mostly about the inner 
momentum of the music sphere).
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between the mathematical proportions corresponding to the chords 
and their ‘empirical behaviour’ (i.e. on a string): this difference, by 
a very small, inaudible, interval called the ‘Pythagorean comma’, 
thus constitutes an in-built irrationality in the musical rationalisa-
tion process.7 (2) The tension between the rational and the irrational 
becomes constitutive of different music systems and of their creativ-
ity, as they adopt a principle for productively coping with it whilst 
inevitably perpetuating it. (3) The encounter of that principle (e.g. 
‘tonal ratio’ in the Western music system) with the needs of musi-
cal expression (‘life’) actualises the tension in a way that is creative 
and ‘form-giving’, in what can be termed the ever evolving ‘spirit’ of 
Western music (1924a: 455), but can also ultimately undermine the 
whole system, if stretched too far.
 On the basis of this discovery, Weber sought to demonstrate that 
the interplay between the rational and the irrational is prompted 
by every rationalisation process and is ‘dynamically of the highest 
developmental significance’ (1988a: 438, 1981: 179). But it cannot be 
contended that Weber found a ‘Pythagorean comma’ in all spheres: 
rationalisation processes, as they stumble on ‘irrationalities’, there is 
only rarely a pure effect of the deployment of the dynamic of ratio-
nalisation itself.
 As far as the sphere of the capitalist economy is concerned, its 
spirit was bequeathed so to speak from outside. Economic rational-
ism had always been associated with capitalist forms, but it is the 
Puritans’ restless need to prove themselves as worthy of salvation 
which brought about the systematisation of the rationalisation of 
economic activity as an end in itself (1991: 11-12); the ‘inner (psycho-
logically conditioned) interests’ of a particular carrier stratum was 
thus a wholly irrational motive seen from the perspective of eco-
nomic rationalism. In generalising his findings of the music study to 
the workings of rationality, Weber suggested that the in-built irra-
tionalities of processes of practical rationalisation of life are directly 
traceable to the motives and interests of the carrier strata of such 
 7. In effect, though the consonant intervals (octave, fifth and fourth) obtained 
by pressing down the string of a one-string instrument (‘monochord’) in different 
places, correspond, in the length of the string segment, to mathematical ‘ratios’ 
(respectively 1/2, 3/4 and 2/3, which, in addition only resort to prime numbers)—
a discovery attributed to Pythagoras, the encounter between mathematical and 
musical ratios quickly found its limits, since, for example, cycles of fifths and octaves 
end up meeting on the same note, whereas the corresponding powers of their ratios 
never equalise (the difference is, precisely, the ‘Pythagorean comma’).
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rationalisations. He put forward this hypothesis in the ‘Categories’ 
essay (1913), as well as, more explicitly, in the ‘Introduction’ to the 
Economic Ethics (already in the version published in 1915):
Phenomena apparently directly conditioned by instrumental ratio-
nality were actually historically brought into being through wholly 
irrational motives, and thereafter, because changing life conditions 
let them accrue a high degree of technical ‘correct rationality’, they 
survived as ‘adaptations’ and occasionally became universal (1988a: 
435).
In the same way as in music, the Pythagorean ‘comma’ resisted 
complete rationalisation steered to tonal physics, the various great 
[music] systems of all peoples and ages differentiated themselves above 
all in the art and manner in which they have covered up or bypassed 
this inescapable irrationality, or, conversely, put it at the service of the 
richness of tonalities, this seemed to happen to the theoretical image 
of the world but even far more to the practical rationalisation of life. 
There too, each of the great types of rational methodical life conduct 
were characterised above all through the irrational presuppositions, 
taken as a given, that they had integrated. What these were was deter-
mined, at the very least to a very large extent, by the specificity of 
those strata which were the carriers of the methodical [conduct of] life 
in question, at the decisive time for its coining, i.e. by their external 
(socially conditioned) and inner (psychologically conditioned) inter-
ests (1991: 11-12).
Thus, contrary to the dynamic of rationalisation in music, which so 
to speak breeds its own inner irrationality (even though it is then 
human beings—composers—who actualise it and, through their cre-
ations, make this spirit ever evolve), the ‘irrationality’ of the ascetic 
Protestant quest and the economic rationalism of capitalism were 
brought together through a relation of ‘affinity’ or ‘adequacy’, with-
out there being any necessity to such relation.8 Thus at the same 
time as ascetic Protestantism decisively contributed to the coining of 
‘homo oeconomicus’, it lodged irrationality within the capitalist spirit: 
indeed Weber contended that there could have been no mobilisa-
tion for modern rational capitalism without such irrational under-
pinning. Here again, we see that the spirit of capitalism is deployed 
 8. As we shall see below, another modality of ‘encounter’ between the ratio-
nal and the irrational components of a ‘spirit’ is that of the ethical ‘transfiguration’ 
(Verklärung) of the carrier stratum—such a phenomenon is pointed by Weber with 
regard to the bureaucracy of the Chinese empire, whose carriers’ practical ratio-
nalism is ‘transfigured’ by Confucianism, the outcome constituting the ‘spirit’ of 
Chinese bureaucracy (Weber 1998: 148); as well as with regard to the ‘spirit of ratio-
nal bureaucracy’ (see below in text).
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in the tension between the rational and the irrational (or, said in 
more rigorous terms, between a kind of rationality and what from 
the point of view of such rationality is irrational). The spirit of capi-
talism, like the spirit of music, is not and, cannot be a spirit of pure 
rationality, as it mobilises life towards human accomplishments; 
and such life cannot be reduced to the mere expression of calculative 
rationality—the human being cannot be reduced to the rational ‘eco-
nomic subject’ whom Weber had characterised in his 1898 lectures 
in economics (Hennis 2000a: 121). The following two sections illus-
trate the actualisation of this interplay for the continued shaping of 
‘adequate’ workers and entrepreneurs.
 But the tension between the rational and the irrational not 
only constitutes the spirit of rationalised spheres of human action, 
it also spurs their dynamic. The initial ‘lodging’ of irrationality at 
the heart of modern capitalism triggers its resurgence and irruption 
under the guise of material, substantive rationalities opposed to 
formal calculative rationality, which is how Weber conceptualised 
the dynamic of crises of capitalism. In particular, it is because the 
economic pursuit has been made a pursuit in its own right (initially 
for other-worldly motives) that the orientation of economic action ‘to 
the provision for the desire of utilities (Nutzleistungen)’, ‘or chances 
of disposal’ thereof, has, ‘since the middle of the 19th century’, been 
effectuated in a ‘capitalistic way’, that is to say, with ‘absolute indif-
ference (in the case of a fully free market)…towards all substantive 
postulates whatsoever’, and hence also towards the distribution of 
income. The provision of goods is steered merely to the ‘constella-
tion of marginal utilities’ in ‘the income group with typically the 
purchasing power and the purchasing inclination for a given util-
ity’. This is a ‘limit of principle to its rationality’ but one which is 
constitutive of the rationalised capitalist order (1922: 31, 59; 1924b: 1, 
239; Tribe 2006: 23). Indeed the tension between the (relative) depen-
dency of modern capitalism on the ‘constellation of marginal utili-
ties’ for the consumption of its products and its striving for enforcing 
what classical economists considered as the natural ‘whip of hunger’ 
(Weber 1924b: 240) ultimately opened up a terrain for social struggle 
and regulations which stretched formal capitalist rationality, and, 
with socialism, for the destruction of formal capitalistic rationality 
and the steering of the economy purely to a material rationality of 
provision for need (1922: 60). Weber also pointed to the irruption of 
speculative interests as another kind of material rationality which 
interferes with formal capitalist rationality and causes tensions, and 
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periodically, crises (e.g. 1924b: 16; Tribe 2006: 37). This was part of 
the momentum set off by the capitalist spirit, with its anchor in the 
initial, constitutive, resolution of the tension through the heralding 
of work and money-making as Beruf, as ends in themselves—a reso-
lution that itself bore in nuce all the future tensions, as the calling 
gave way to adaptation. It is in this ever renewed tension that ‘life’ is 
mobilised and that human beings engage in capitalist ventures and 
work. The question is thus: how did Weber account for the resulting 
shaping of ‘forms of life’ suitable for the ever renewed and lively, 
active adaptation to the capitalist order?
The shaping of the modern worker
In chapter II of PE, Weber stressed the extremely artificial character 
of the mobilisation expected from workers, at least from the point 
of view of traditionalist rationality, whereby human beings seek to 
earn what they need with the minimum of exertion. The ‘unnatural’ 
consideration of work as a duty in itself could only come, in Weber’s 
view, as a result of a ‘prolonged process of education’ (1920: 46). 
Although capitalism was likely to still need a ‘powerful helper’ (of 
a strength comparable to that of e.g. a Pietistic education) at times 
(1920: 47), Weber considered that this education process was now 
perpetuated through the conditions of economic selection as such:
Thus present day capitalism, which has succeeded in ruling economic 
life, educates and creates, through economic selection, the economic 
subjects—both entrepreneurs and workers—that it needs for itself 
(1920: 37).
The way in which and extent to which capitalist firms shaped human 
beings into adapted workers was at the core of a collaborative survey 
on the problems of workers and the conditions of industrial work in 
Germany between 1907 and 1911, launched by the Verein für Sozial-
politik (Association for Social Policy) and which Weber helped to co-
ordinate. His guidelines to the collaborators on the survey asked:
What sort of men (Was für Menschen) does the modern large industry 
stamp (prägt) through its immanent characteristics, and what occu-
pational fate (berufliches Schicksal) (and through this, indirectly, extra-
occupational fate as well) does it prepare for them? (1924c: 37).9
 9. An English translation is available (see Weber 1971). Weber wrote the ‘Meth-
odological introduction’ once the survey questionnaire and workplan had already 
been adopted. Alfred Weber had drafted the questionnaire, and it is not known 
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This question, which heads part III of the ‘Methodological introduc-
tion’ to the survey, i.e. the methodology proper, synthesised and 
prioritised the two overarching opening questions:
The present survey seeks to establish, on the one hand, what effect 
large self-contained industry exerts on the personal particularity, 
the occupational fate and extra-occupational ‘style of life’ of work-
ers (Arbeiterschaft), what physical and psychic qualities it develops, 
and how these are expressed in the general life conduct of work-
ers (Arbeiterschaft); on the other hand, to what extent large industry, 
for its part, is bound, in its development capacity and development 
direction by given qualities of its workforce (Arbeiterschaft), gener-
ated by its ethnic, social, cultural provenance, tradition and life con-
ditions (1924c: 1).
The former formulation shows that it is the way in which the profit-
ability driven ‘apparatus’ set up in firms of the large ‘self-contained’ 
industry seeks to shape worker’s performance (Leistung), so as to get 
maximum profit from it, which is at the core of the survey, rather 
than the influence of workers’ backgrounds on the performance 
and orientation of the firm.10 Weber suggested that this takes place 
through procedures and systems of selection, remuneration, control, 
which he later generically referred to as ‘discipline’.11
 Indeed the whole practice of discipline towards workers was con-
tained in the invention of ‘formally free labour’, which Weber analy-
sed in Economy and Society (hereafter ES). Formally free labour, of 
which one should not forget that it is predicated upon the ‘coercive 
power of the property order’, presupposes the employers’ freedom 
of selection according to performance, the ‘selection of the efficient 
(leistungsfähig)’. This, for the bulk of workers, happens ‘on the job’, 
through the ‘on the job learning test’—but does not stop there: pro-
ductivity is continuously monitored and the associated threat of dis-
missal is in fact the continuation of selection on a daily basis (1922: 
71, 88; 1924c: 46).
whether Max took part in this first draft, but both the questionnaire and the work 
plan were collectively worked upon in the session of the responsible subcommittee 
of the Verein in June 1908, and both can be regarded as the product of collective 
work. See Schluchter and Frommer 1998: 229-30.
 10. Weber made this clear in a letter to his brother: ‘The inner structure and life 
chances which the self-contained large industry forms and creates, would in any 
case in my opinion be the first factor to investigate…’ (Letter dated 3/9/1907 quoted 
in Schluchter and Frommer 1998: 227).
 11. In the lecture on ‘Socialism’ (1918) and above all in chapter II of ES (‘The 
sociological categories of economic action’), written in 1920.
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 Part of this continuous selection process is, in addition, transferred 
to the worker himself, since the ‘work-seeker’ must make sure and 
show that he is up to the task—permanently so. As is well known, the 
remuneration system can also play its role in this.12 Overall Weber 
points here to the emotional, affective component of the discipline 
of ‘formally free labour’, through the use of the word Sorge, which is 
both worry and care (the latter meaning also responsibility or duty 
for the care of). Thus, the transfer to the worker of the responsibility 
for family maintenance and for permanent self-selection is not only 
a transfer of responsibility: by generating anxiety and worry, it ties 
the worker further to his job with an economy of means that far out-
does the systems of unfree labour (1922: 87). This constitutes much 
of the enforced ‘spirit of adaptation’ of workers to advanced capital-
ism since productivity measurements lead workers to be constantly 
concerned with their own adequacy for the job or task.
 The survey on industrial workers aimed at exploring not only the 
conditions and implications of selection but also the modalities of 
adaptation to the task and their own consequences on workers’ ‘style 
of life’ and ‘qualities’.13 For that purpose, the observation of the pro-
duction process, and more particularly of the operation of machines, 
coupled with worker interviews, were meant to test the hypothesis 
that the key qualities required for the operation of a machine deter-
mined not only the selection of workers but also their occupational 
 12. This is especially the case with the system standing in closer ‘adequacy’ with 
‘formally free labour’ and rational calculation: piece-rates. This system compels the 
worker to hold his own productivity constantly in check, so as to maintain sufficient 
earnings for survival. In forcing thus the implacable formal rationality of profitability 
calculations directly on to the worker himself, this remuneration system pertains to 
the most ‘eminently dynamic, economically revolutionary’ systems of income avail-
able in capitalism and as such it faced considerable resistance from workers’ material 
rationalities, as noted by Weber in PE (1920: 44-5). By contrast ‘salaries’ (paid for a 
period of time) are ‘economically conservative’: they do not advance the cause of 
formal rationality, but rather find themselves on the side of material rationalities 
(1922: 87, 121; 1924c: 46).
 13. Although, in his review of ‘psychophysical’ studies (1998b), Weber acknowl-
edged the considerable work carried out on these issues by the ‘natural sciences’ 
(experimental psychology being considered as such), he also very much highlighted 
the limits of ‘psychophysics’ (and, by the same token, of studies of heredity), espe-
cially with regard to ‘characterological’ classifications, which in his view were far 
from being thought through and even remained inferior to the ancient notion of the 
‘four humours’ (Temperamente) (see Hennis 2000b: 36-38). Weber therefore advised 
his colleagues to rely on their own observation, intuition and everyday categories to 
describe and analyse differences in dispositions and interests (1924c: 25).
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path within the firm—and thus their objective ‘occupational fate’ 
(1924c: 11).
 A key to understanding in what ways the task has a structuring 
effect on the whole make-up of the worker’s life, his whole ‘habi-
tus’, is Weber’s treatment of the question of workers’ attitudes to job 
change and change in general, a crucial question for analysing the 
course of rationalising ‘developmental trends’ in the large capital-
ist industry. Taking into account that job change is only revealing 
where earnings are not negatively affected,14 it does appear, Weber 
remarked, that workers may be willing to move firm and place, but 
not alter the contents of the job. So that one can wonder whether 
some kind of habituation to the machine and the task one performs 
with it takes place, which perhaps even translates into an inner 
attuning (Eingestelltheit) to the task. Weber expressed strong res-
ervations with regard to the possibility, aired by psychiatrists and 
experimental psychologists Wilhelm Wundt and Emil Kraepelin, 
of ascertaining a psycho-physical attuning (i.e. the inner effectua-
tion of set dispositions through ‘practice’), as well as with regard to 
the relevance of doing so. Nevertheless, he did consider it a definite 
possibility, worth exploring, that workers’ attitude to job and task 
change could be linked to the nature of the work and to an ‘inner 
binding’ to the job, which in part could take the shape of a feeling of 
‘mastery’ (Beherrschen) over the machine (1924c: 15).
 In other words, I would contend that Weber was looking to account 
for workers’ ‘subjective attitude’ to their job directly in Eingestelltheit, 
i.e. here through the inscription of an habitual orientation to the job as 
unintended consequence of imposed discipline. Whilst such habitu-
ation could be rationally encouraged and spurred by firms, since the 
general idea is that familiarity with a task brings about maximum 
output (1924c: 23), it is nonetheless at the same time irrational, in the 
sense of engendering an inner bonding (Bindung) of the worker to 
his task, job and machine: a combination of habituation and affect 
which must stand as the ‘polar opposite’ to economic self-interest, 
be it under the guise of need (1922: 15). Indeed habituation could 
also very well be targeted and crushed by that very discipline, if it 
 14. The ‘Methodological introduction’ makes clear that one has to start from the 
premise that workers’ attitude to job change is overwhelmingly determined by the 
economics of the equation: and since any job change requires a period of adaptation 
during which one’s productivity is likely to be below standards—which, in systems 
of remuneration through piece-rates immediately translates into lower earnings, 
workers usually resist change (Weber 1924c: 23-24).
 Darmon  No ‘new spirit’? 205
© Max Weber Studies 2011.
was seen as hampering the workings of the economic logic (e.g. as 
workers were made to be more and more mutually substitutable—
see Weber 1988b: 318).
 In chapter II of the conceptual part of ES, Weber summed up the 
‘external’ and ‘inner (motivational)’ processes shaping workers:
A decisive impulse for all economic action under conditions of a 
market economy is normally: 1. For the propertyless: a) the compul-
sion (Zwang) exerted by the risk of complete deprivation (Unversorgth-
eit) for themselves and those personal ‘dependents’ (children, wives, 
sometimes parents) whose care the individual(s) typically assume(s); 
b) but also, though to a varying extent—an inner adjustment (Einges-
telltheit) to economically productive work as form of life (Lebensform)’ 
(1922: 60).
Weber thus pointed to the formation of a ‘form of life’ (and various 
sub-forms) developing amongst workers, which was more and more 
alien to the traditional or pious form of life of worker communities 
described in PE, but nevertheless was both fostered by and under-
pinned dedication to work. Dedication to work as such was not 
effectuated through the vocational conduct of life (Lebensführung) 
anymore, but through a form of life, with its habits and affects, a 
form of life that could even be ‘sublimated’ into a value, as Weber 
suggests in the ‘Basic Sociological Concepts’ (1922: 12).
The shaping of the modern entrepreneur
In depicting those entrepreneurs in the section of PE which intro-
duces us to the ‘spirit of capitalism’ Weber no doubt had in mind 
those families akin to Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks whose religious 
piety, still impregnating their life in the first half of the 19th century, 
had become etiolated in the second half of the century, but in which 
all other aspects of the early capitalist entrepreneur’s life conduct 
had been transmitted from one generation to the next.15 Weber 
pointed out, in particular, those ‘personal moral qualities’ stemming 
from earlier ‘ethical maxims’, such as the feeling of inner duty and 
responsibility to one’s business; dedication to the task (Sache); hard 
work (Weber remarked on various occasions that managing a firm is 
also ‘work’, ‘labour’, i.e. Arbeit, even though the term has come to be 
associated with the working class);16 and trustworthiness in the eyes 
 15. Weber dates the advent of the modern rational capitalist spirit amongst 
German entrepreneurs back to ‘about the middle of the last century’ (1920: 51).
 16. E.g. see Weber 1922: 62.
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of both the clients and the workforce, so that they will follow him 
when he ‘innovates’ and imprints his ‘new style’ (1920: 53).
 But Weber’s imagined interview with entrepreneurs about their 
‘motivation’ (Motivierung) - probably a reflection of very real conver-
sations—finally brings about the ‘only possible answer’: that their 
business has become ‘indispensable to their life’ (1920: 54). Although 
Weber immediately connected this assertion to the calling in which 
one puts oneself ‘at the service of one’s business and not the reverse’, 
the former formulation points to an attachment, to an ingrained habit, 
a way of life, whereas the latter rather emphasises the subordination 
proper of who assimilates inner-worldly dedication to the task with 
proof before God and before one’s fellows: perhaps it could be said 
that in that process, vocation subsides into lifestyle.17
 This is how the paradoxical paragraph of PE chapter 2 regarding 
the spirit of contemporary capitalism as a product of pure adapta-
tion can be understood in my view, as far as the entrepreneur is 
concerned:
At present under our political, private legal and market institutions, 
with the business forms and the structure proper to our economy, 
this spirit of capitalism might be understandable, as said, purely as a 
product of adaptation. The capitalist economic order necessitates such 
dedication (Hingabe) to the ‘vocation’ of money-making, it is a form of 
behaviour towards external goods which is so very ‘adequate’ to this 
structure, so intricately tied to the conditions for victory in the strug-
gle for economic existence, that in effect there cannot be any mention 
anymore, today, of any necessary relation between this ‘chrematistic’ 
life conduct and any kind of unitary world-view (1920: 55-56).
The ‘vocation’ of money-making, the ‘chrematistic’ life conduct used 
to be anchored in an inner drive, a ‘dedication’, for reaching beyond: 
the early capitalist entrepreneurs were only ‘adapted’ to capitalist 
requirements to the extent that they transformed the world in so 
doing, for God’s glory. But in becoming simply ‘adequate’ to capi-
talist forms and structures, the vocational life conduct has utterly 
lost all trace of the inner psychological tension that had spurred it 
in the first place. Dedication to money-making as such has simply 
become the habitus associated, for entrepreneurs, with advanced 
capitalism—an exemplar of that ‘lifestyle of all the individuals who 
are born into this mechanism’ (1920: 203).
 Indeed, when reflecting in ES on the motivations for economic 
action (notwithstanding the primacy of the striving for income) in 
 17. However Weber himself did not distinguish neatly between the two terms.
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the context of a comparison between market and planned econo-
mies, Weber pointed out, alongside risk taking with one’s capital, 
‘an inner “professional” adjustment (“berufsmäβige” Eingestelltheit) 
towards rational acquisitive activity’. Eingestelltheit is equivalent 
to Einstellung, an inner adjustment or attuning towards something 
which may rest, Weber tells us in the ‘Basic Sociological Concepts’, 
on ‘traditional, affectual or value-rational devotion… or on purpo-
sive-rational interests’ (1922: 26). Yet such adjustment or attuning 
evokes a durable orientation for which one is set or sets oneself—
and thus a mode of relation which creates a habitual inner way of 
being, and must ultimately contradict pure purposive-rational cal-
culation. It has for the ‘lifestyle’ and habitus of the contemporary 
entrepreneur the same function as that inner disposition and orien-
tation referred to by Weber as Gesinnung for the life conduct and 
habitus of the early capitalist entrepreneur, but is wholly devoid of 
its ethical meaning, for Eingestelltheit simply comes about as a result 
of the ‘political, private legal and market institutions, with the busi-
ness forms and the structure proper to our economy’, through which 
the selection of economic subjects is operated. Eingestelltheit and Ges-
innung both set the individual inwardly to certain orientations and 
behaviours. Yet Gesinnung roots the capitalist life conduct into ‘per-
sonal life’ (1910b: 573), that is to say into a life with ethical qualities—
or, in non-Weberian language, a life in which the person overcomes 
the self in the inner construction inherent in her pursuit; whereas 
Eingestelltheit rather entrenches self-centred passions—in particu-
lar, as Weber explained in the passage of ES already referred to, the 
enjoyment of competition and power as such:
The decisive impulse for all economic action under the conditions 
of a market economy is … for those sharing in the chances of eco-
nomic enterprises: (a) one’s own capital-risk and own gain chances, 
combined with (b) an inner ‘professional’ adjustment (‘berufsmäβige’ 
Eingestelltheit) towards rational acquisitive activity as (α) ‘proof’ (‘Bewä-
hrung’) of one’s performance (Leistung); as (β) form of autonomous 
free hand with those human beings dependent on one’s own orders; 
and besides γ) with the chances of an undetermined number of 
people to access important cultural or life goods: in a word, power 
(1922: 50).
The ES portrait, with its focus on the drive towards risk and profit, 
as well as towards economic activity as a test of one’s performance, 
suggests the universe of games, where one’s own purely egotistic 
passions can come to the fore. Indeed Weber had evoked such uni-
verse at the end of PE as that of the American entrepreneurs:
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In the region where it is unleashed most, in the United States, the 
acquisitive striving, stripped from its religious-ethical meaning, tends 
today to associate with purely agonistic passions, which not infre-
quently imprint on it the character of a sport (1920: 204).
The reference to agon (‘agonistic passions’) must not mislead us: 
whereas Weber considered struggle as a necessity for confront-
ing the world, such a stance is completely opposed to indulging in 
agonistic passion as a style of life, as is the case here. Furthermore 
such games remain, in principle, within the calculative rationality of 
modern capitalism. They should thus also be radically distinguished 
from any spirit of adventure, such as found amongst entrepreneurs 
prior to the advent of rational capitalism: ‘however hazardous from 
a purely objective point of view, [risk-taking] has absolutely not the 
meaning of “adventure”, since it is a component of a rationally cal-
culated business deal, imposed by the “task” itself’ (1910b: 597).
 The leader of the modern firm is not only a market actor, he 
exerts his power within his firm: how is that power to be charac-
terised? Modern firms have become bureaucracies, indeed they can 
be described as ‘unequalled models of strict bureaucratic organisa-
tion’ (2009b: 25).18 The ‘objective discharge of business’ is put to the 
service of ‘the pursuit of naked interest’, and this means, vis-à-vis 
workers, the enforcement of naked power, since the only principle 
is the rational profitability of the firm. Weber’s reference to the ‘free 
hand’ of the business leader over his workforce corresponds to the 
notion of a ‘naked’ power: the term ‘naked’ (as in ‘naked interest 
situation’, ‘naked market principle’, ‘naked property’) surges up 
again and again in Weber’s account of the ideal-typical ‘market situ-
ation’, to signal the complete uprooting of any ethical regulation, 
the complete opposition to any form of ethical life conduct and the 
pure interplay of market forces (1922: 15, 23; 2009a: 78-88). Thus, 
again, the total power involved in the management of a capitalist 
business is ‘adequate’ to contemporary capitalism and its rational-
ity. The institutions of the market economy are there to foster the 
corresponding aspirations and attitudes in entrepreneurs and busi-
ness leaders, to ‘set’ them towards the correct behaviours. But these, 
 18. Edith Hanke notes that this link between bureaucracy and capitalism was 
frequently made amongst contemporary scholars (and Marxist politicians), espe-
cially with regard to their ‘cultural significance’ (Alfred Weber) and to their com-
bined levelling effects. Weber was alone however in characterising bureaucracy in a 
systematic way (especially with regard to the administration without regard to the 
person). See Hanke 2009: 245.
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Weber insisted, are so incomprehensible and reprehensible, not only 
to a traditionalist eye, but from the ‘standpoint of personal happi-
ness’ (1920: 54), from the standpoint of what ‘we may designate as a 
“natural” ’ way of being human (36), of what ‘human beings will “by 
nature” ’ (44):19 in so doing, in ensuring Eingestelltheit towards these 
materially irrational behaviours, they also create a frame of mind 
and a way of life which can become entrenched and turn into ends in 
themselves rather than remain subordinated to economic rationality, 
as is evidenced in the way in which the reserve shown in the exercise 
of power by the ideal-typical entrepreneur has given way to enjoy-
ment of power as such (the former tends to be more emphasised in 
PE, the latter in ES).
Justification and regulation in contemporary capitalism
What, then, is the status of justification and its role in mobilisation 
for contemporary capitalism? For Boltanski and Chiapello, capital-
ism requires ‘engagement’ and such engagement is dependent on 
the capacity of capitalism to ‘incorporate a moral dimension’, that 
is to say on its amenability to evaluation according to negotiated 
standards of justice and thus on the possibility both of justification 
and critique (2005: 485-87).
 In Weber’s analysis, as I have shown, contemporary capitalism 
rests on adaptation, and it is Eingestelltheit that generally ensures, for 
workers and entrepreneurs alike, the continued orientation of ‘eco-
nomic subjects’ to work and rational money-making for their own 
sake, by setting individuals to such pursuits and the ‘form of life’ 
or ‘lifestyle’ associated with them, and by attuning their interests 
and affects. In the same way as the regulations of capitalism need 
not, indeed cannot, be grounded in any ethics anymore, no ethical 
foundations are needed for the mobilisation of individuals:
Still less, naturally, can it be contended that the subjective appropria-
tion of these ethical maxims on the part of its individual carriers, as 
for example the entrepreneurs or workers of modern capitalistic firms, 
is a condition of the further existence of present-day capitalism. The 
capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into 
which the individual is born, and which is given to him, at least as an 
individual, as an unalterable casing (Gehäuse) in which he must live. It 
 19. Weber’s references to the idea of nature in these contexts are always between 
inverted commas—thus pointing to what is generally understood as a way of life 
close to natural cycles rather than to Weber’s own concept of nature.
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imposes the norms of economic action on the individual, in so far as he 
is entangled in the system of market relationships (1920: 36-37).
As emerges from Weber’s Vocation lectures, particularly ‘Politics as 
vocation and profession’, to conduct one’s life in an ethical sense 
in the contemporary age demands that we should ‘stretch beyond’, 
towards a cause or personal creation that challenges the everyday, 
whilst facing up to the conditions for that striving in the life order 
of its deployment (1994a: 88). Such conduct of life is an impossibility 
in the contemporary capitalist sphere, which but commands adapta-
tion to its conditions.
 This does not mean that economic participation merely takes place 
through dull unconscious habit. Weber made this very explicit for the 
third key (and rising) figure of the economic sphere, as well as key 
actor of the governmental sphere, namely the Fachmensch, the special-
ist type of human being. The Fachmensch is characterised by his special-
ist training and has a position as administrative employee or official. 
He is the carrier of the rationality of ‘objectivation’, in the sense of 
calculation and de-personalisation, initially in the ‘state cosmos’, but 
increasingly also in the ‘cosmos of the modern rationalised capitalist 
economy’ (1991: 214, 230) and that of modern science. However the 
Fachmensch is far from being a mere product and bearer of the ratio-
nalisation processes of the depersonalised orders. He is not content 
with abiding by the logic of objectivation of the orders in which his 
action is inscribed, but rather ‘transfigures’ this ratio into a value:
This objective purpose is of course usually underpinned by ‘cultural 
value ideas’ thought of as realised in a community—‘State’, ‘Church’, 
‘Commune’, ‘Party’, ‘Firm’—which, as surrogates for this-worldly or 
even other-worldly personal rulers, transfigure it ideologically (ihn 
ideologisch verklärend) (2009b: 14).
This, as well as the more general diffusion of the ‘value of good 
administration’ (1988b: 221, 1994: 158) in the ‘public’ at large, infuses 
him with energy, and even relative initiative and autonomy within 
the boundaries set by orders and procedures (1988b: 223). Yet all 
the energy, initiative and autonomy are directed to the reproduction 
and further extension of the rationalised everyday: as orders can 
very much be ‘actively carried out’ (1988a: 472), the dynamics of the 
de-personalised orders creates what could be called figures of active 
adaptation, who, in the manner of Nietzsche’s last men, believe that 
they have ‘discovered happiness’.
 The impossibility of ethics and vocational life conduct in the eco-
nomic sphere does not mean either that there does not arise a need 
 Darmon  No ‘new spirit’? 211
© Max Weber Studies 2011.
for individuals to justify themselves as economic subjects taking 
part in the capitalist system, especially in front of ‘the pathetic anti-
chrematistic protest from artistic, ethical and above all simply human 
points of view’ against the spirit of capitalism. These ‘protests’ are 
echoed by the two main currents of critique distinguished by Bol-
tanski and Chiapello, namely the artist and social critique (though 
Weber set them against a background of wider ‘human protest’). But, 
Weber very clearly stated in a crucial passage of the ‘Final Rebuttal’, 
such justification lacks all trace of that ‘consistent unity of ethical self-
justification’ that had characterised Protestant early capitalists, ‘even 
amongst the sternest men’. Weber radically questioned the status of 
justification in a sphere resting on adaptation: it could only amount 
to the ‘legitimation’ of one’s participation in the capitalist economy, 
and resorted to discourses—such as ‘modern-style liberal’ claims 
that capitalism is ‘a somehow relatively optimal means of making 
the relative best of the relative best of worlds’—which could only 
be ‘surrogates, easily recognisable as such’, for the ethics once held 
(1910b: 574; 2001: 102). It is ‘the interests underpinning commercial 
and social policies [that] tend to determine conceptions of the world 
(Weltanschauungen)’ (1920: 56), not the reverse.
 The interplay between rationality and irrationality set out by 
Weber nevertheless also points to the crucial role of material ratio-
nalities for the regulation of advanced capitalism, and, in that sense, 
the interplay unravelled between capitalist formal rationality and 
substantive rationalities is not dissimilar from the dialectic of critique 
and justification/regulation exposed in The new spirit. Eingestelltheit 
does not only secure adaptation: it also creates renewed tensions 
between formal and material rationalities which in turn fuel the 
crises and the struggles that make up the dynamic of capitalism.
 But the question arises, then, as to the status of the ‘moral dimen-
sion’ allegedly incorporated by capitalism. For Weber, as is well 
known, the peculiarity of capitalist objectivation lies precisely in its 
‘neither ethical, nor anti-ethical, but simply non-ethical’ character 
(2009b: 196). The regulations set up as a result of ‘ordered struggle’ 
are subordinated to the rationality of the market, they are intro-
duced to the extent that they ultimately uphold such logic: indeed 
this could not be otherwise in a capitalist system.20 The ‘moral’—or 
 20. Weber very much supported such ‘ordered struggles’ and considered it a 
matter for social policy to uphold their possibility, as shown for example in a letter 
sent out as part of his attempt to create a working group stemming from the left wing 
of the Verein für Sozialpolitik: he denounced ‘the increasing pointlessness of orderly 
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material—checks on capitalism are indeed brought about by human 
beings acting upon the dynamic set off by capitalism itself, but that 
does not make capitalism a contributor to the common good. The 
capitalist economy is simply ‘the most rational form for procuring 
the material goods indispensable to all inner-worldly culture’, as 
Weber indicated in his recapitulation of the accomplishments of the 
inner-worldly value spheres towards the end of the ‘Intermediate 
Reflection’ (1991: 230).
Conclusion
In this paper, I have sought to explain Weber’s view of the modali-
ties through which ‘today’s capitalism, which has succeeded in 
ruling over economic life’, selects ‘for itself the economic subjects—
entrepreneurs and workers—that it needs’. Such selection amounts 
to ‘educat[ing] and shap[ing]’ (1920: 37): Weber’s reluctant use of the 
notion of selection points to the need to look at the wider conditions 
of production of patterns of conduct. Indeed, as in the music sphere, 
it is the dynamic of interplay between ‘ratio’ and the irrationalities 
it raises, but also the interplay between ‘ratio’ and ‘life’ (an overlap-
ping but not equivalent relation), which shapes types of ‘economic 
subjects’—even in such an objectivated, de-personalised sphere as 
the modern capitalist economy: this is why even the rational capital-
ist economy constitutes a ‘life order’.
 Weber did not contend that all spirit had vanished from the ‘cara-
pace, as hard as steel’ of rationalised capitalism: only the ascetic 
spirit had fled from it, but its heir, demanding dedication to work 
and money-making ‘as if’ through vocation, was, and still is, neces-
sary (from the point of view of capitalist rationality). This spirit, like 
the inner-worldly ascetic spirit, develops in the interplay between 
strikes, which results from the increasing predominance/superiority of the entrepre-
neurial organisations of all sorts in connection with judicial and police bullying; and 
the systematic formation of subsidised troops for the protection of employers within 
the workforce [NB this is how trade unions used to refer to the workers’ committees 
set up with the support of employers]’; and he pledged to ‘fight without reservation 
the conditions of capitalist rule in the model of Pittsburg, the Saar region, of the 
heavy industry in Westphalia and Silesia and the help it receives from state power 
(Staatsgewalt), because we want to live in a country of citizens, not serfs’ (1998c: 
750). This contest around the conditions of strikes can be said to constitute a ‘test’ in 
Boltanki and Chiapello’s sense, i.e. a ‘privileged moment of judgement, of evaluation 
and hence selection, of remuneration, of positive or negative sanction’—from which 
‘the order derived’ must be ‘held to be just’ (2005: 489-90).
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the rational and the irrational. As the example of the shaping of 
the worker has shown, adaptation mobilises affects, e.g. worry, 
attachment, as well as bonding and meaning. Furthermore Weber’s 
analysis of the Fachmensch suggested that adaptation takes energy, 
drive, even initiative; and that it is facilitated by ‘transfigurations’ of 
rationality into values which self-justify ourselves in our own eyes. 
Unless this is recognised, and unless the antagonism between such 
forms of active adaptation and the liberty at the heart of Weber’s 
notion of ‘life conduct’ is acknowledged, we are bound to fail to see 
that our own age is an age of fundamental repetition, rather than 
one of any ‘new spirit’. We are also bound to confuse new forms 
of mobilisation of the workforce (through new forms of discipline) 
with the enhanced possibility for conduct, and thus to be blind to 
the need of nurturing spheres of human accomplishment as spheres 
of vocation and to fight against their trivialisation through the ever 
extending market logic.
 Finally, so long as the adjustments and changes in capitalist forms 
and regulation resulting from the settling of capitalist crises and 
struggles abide by the formal calculative rationality of capitalism, 
and so long as adaptation to such rationality prevails, it may be con-
tended with Weber that it is the same capitalist system and capitalist 
spirit which are thus perpetuated: without any new economic ratio-
nality, there is no ‘new spirit of capitalism’. But although refusing 
to risk any prognosis, Weber also cautioned that the absence of the 
possibility of any rooting of capitalism in the ‘personality as a whole’ 
was not innocuous for capitalism itself:
And it would be a serious mistake to believe that this circumstance 
remains irrelevant to the position of capitalism in culture as a whole, 
including first its cultural effects but equally its inner essence and 
finally its fate (1910b: 574; 2001: 102; translation altered).
The rise of the ‘last human beings’ evoked at the end of PE undoubt-
edly counted as the kind of ‘cultural effects’ which Weber had in 
view. The ‘forms of life’, ‘lifestyles’ succeeding to Lebensführung, the 
attuning succeeding to Gesinnung, the transfiguration and legitima-
tion of interests succeeding the calling, make advanced capitalism 
more amenable to challenges to its rationality. And what, if not a 
change of rationality, could affect the ‘inner essence’ and finally the 
‘fate’ of capitalism? We may wonder whether the place assigned to 
speculative interests and the ‘unfettered quest for gain’ in present 
day capitalism are just one more instance of the tensions inherent 
in the momentum of the capitalist sphere or whether they point to 
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a displacement of formal economic rationality and thus to a real 
change of ‘spirit’. Weber’s teaching had sought to instil change from 
other quarters, and to ground challenges to the capitalist rule in ter-
rains of vocation subtracted from the capitalist spirit, that is, in radi-
cal opposition to adaptation.
Bibliography
Boltanski, L., and E. Chiapello
 2005 The new spirit of capitalism (London and New York: Verso).
Braun, C.
 1992 Max Webers “Musiksoziologie” (Laaber: Laaber-Verlag).
 1999 ‘The “Science of Reality” of Music History: on the Historical Back-
ground to Max Weber’s Study of Music’, in Max Weber and the culture 
of anarchy (ed. Sam Whimster; Basingstoke and New York: Mac-
millan): 176-95.
Darmon, I.
 2011 Max Weber’s science of reality. Types of human being and the possibil-
ity of life conduct in contemporary culture (Manchester: University of 
Manchester).
Ghosh, P.
 2005 ‘Not the Protestant Ethic? Max Weber at St. Louis’, History of European 
Ideas 31.3: 367-407.
Hanke, E.
 2009 ‘Nachwort’, Max Weber Studienausgabe, I/22-4 (ed. Edith Hanke 
with the collaboration of Thomas Kroll; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck]): 229-79.
Henrich, D.
 1952 Die Einheit der Wissenschaftslehre Max Webers (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr).
Hennis, W.
 2000a Max Weber’s Central Question (trans. Keith Tribe; Newbury: Threshold 
Press).
 2000b Max Weber’s Science of Man: New Studies for a Biography of the Work 
(trans. Keith Tribe; Newbury: Threshold Press).
Jaffé, E., W. Sombart and M. Weber
 1904 ‘Geleitwort der Herausgeber’, Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozial-
politik 19: I-VII.
Schluchter, W., and S. Frommer
 1998 ‘Anhang’, I/11 Studienausgabe der Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (ed. Wolf-
gang Schluchter with the collaboration of Sabine Frommer; Tübin-
gen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]): 223-68.
Swedberg, R.
 2011 ‘Max Weber’s Central Text in Economic Sociology’, in The Sociology of 
Economic Life (ed. Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg; Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press): 62-77.
Tribe, K.
 2006 ‘Max Weber’s “Conceptual Preface” to General Economic History: 
Introduction and Translation’, Max Weber Studies Beiheft I: 11-38.
 Darmon  No ‘new spirit’? 215
© Max Weber Studies 2011.
Weber, Max
 1910a ‘Antikritisches zum “Geist” des Kapitalismus’, Archiv für Sozialwis-
senschaft und Sozialpolitik, 30: 176-202.
 1910b ‘Antikritisches Schlußwort zum “Geist des Kapitalismus” ’, Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik 31: 554-99.
 1920 ‘Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus’, in Gesam-
melte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (ed. Marianne Weber; Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]): 17-206.
 1922 Grundriß der Sozialökonomik, III. Abteilung. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
[Economy and Society] (ed. Marianne Weber; Tübingen: J.C.B Mohr 
[Paul Siebeck]).
 1924a ‘Geschäftsbericht und Diskussionsreden auf den deutschen soziolo-
gischen Tagungen. 1910, 1912’, in Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie 
und Sozialpolitik (ed. Marianne Weber; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck]): 431-91.
 1924b Wirtschaftsgeschichte: Abriss der universalen Sozial-und Wirtschafts-
Geschichte. Aus den nachgelassenen Vorlesungen (eds. S. Hellman and 
M.Palyi; Munich: Duncker & Humblot).
 1924c ‘Methodologische Einleitung für die Erhebungen des Vereins für 
Sozialpolitik über Auslese und Anpassung (Berufswahlen und Beruf-
sschicksal) der Arbeiterschaft der geschlossenen Großindustrie’, in 
Gesammelte Aufsätzen zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik (ed. Marianne 
Weber; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]): 1-60.
 1958 The rational and social foundations of music (ed. Don Martindale, 
Johannes Riedel and Gertrude Neuwirth; Carbondale, IL: Southern 
Illinois University Press).
 1971 ‘Methodological introduction for the survey for the Society for Social 
Policy concerning selection and adaptation (choice and course of 
occupation) for the workers of major industrial enterprises’, in The 
Interpretation of Social Reality (ed. J.E.T. Eldridge; London: Michael 
Joseph): 103-158.
 1981 ‘Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology’, The Sociological Quarterly 
22.2: 151-80.
 1988a Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschafstlehre (ed. Johannes Winckel-
mann; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
 1988b Zur Politik im Weltkrieg: Schriften und Reden 1914–1918 , I/15, Studien-
ausgabe der Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (eds. Wolfgang J. Mommsen 
and Gangolf Hübinger; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
 1991 Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen Konfuzianismus und Taoismus: 
Schriften 1915–1920, Vol. I/19, Studienausgabe der Max Weber Gesam-
tausgabe (ed. Helwig Schmidt-Glintzer and Petra Kolonko; Tübingen 
J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
 1994a Wissenschaft als Beruf, 1917/1919; Politik als Beruf, 1919, I/17, Studien-
ausgabe der Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen and 
Wolfgang Schluchter; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]): 35-88.
 1994b Political Writings (ed. Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs; Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press).
 1998a Selections in translation (ed. Walter G. Runciman; Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press).
216 Max Weber Studies
© Max Weber Studies 2011.
 1998b Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit. Schriften und Reden 1908–1912, 
I/11 Studienausgabe der Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (ed. Wolfgang 
Schluchter with the collaboration of Sabine Frommer; Tübingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
 1998c Briefe 1911–1912, II/7 (ed. M. Rainer Lepsius and Wolfgang J. Momm-
sen in collaboration with Birgit Rudhard and Manfred Schön; Tübin-
gen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
 2001 The Protestant ethic debate: Max Weber’s replies to his critics, 1907–1910 
(ed. David J. Chalcraft and Austin Harrington; Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press).
 2002 The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism (ed. Stephen Kalberg; 
Oxford and Los Angeles: Blackwell and Roxbury Publishing Com-
pany).
 2004 Zur Musiksoziologie, I/14 [The Sociology of Music] (ed. Christoph 
Braun and Ludwig Finscher; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
 2009a Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ord-
nungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. 1. Teilband: Gemeinschaften, I/22-1, Studi-
enausgabe der Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (ed. Wolfgang J. Mommsen 
in collaboration with Michael Meyer; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul 
Siebeck]).
 2009b Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Die Wirtschaft und die gesellschaftlichen Ord-
nungen und Mächte. Nachlaß. 4. Teilband: Herrschaft, I/22-4, Studien-
ausgabe der Max Weber Gesamtausgabe (ed. Edith Hanke with the 
collaboration of Thomas Kroll; Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck]).
